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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CAROLYN CRUMP n/k/a * 
CAROLYN FORSGREN, PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
* CERTIORARI 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
* Court of Appeals Case No. 
vs. 900362-CA 
* 
ROBERT CRUMP, Utah Supreme Court 
* Case No. 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Carolyn Forsgren, by and through counsel, 
hereby petitions the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari to 
review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals entered in the above-
entitled action on or about November 22, 1991, the Honorable Norman H. 
Jackson, Judge, the Honorable Reginal W. Garff, Judge, Concurring, and 
the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, Dissenting. 
QUESTION FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff/Respondent requests this Court to review the following 
issue: Does Utah, under the facts and circumstances presented in this 
case, and pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
("UCCJA") and the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act ("PKPA"), 
have jurisdiction to initially hear Defendant's Petition to Modify a 
Montana Decree of Divorce regarding custody and to subsequently hear 
Defendant/Appellant's appeal? 
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REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The official opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed on November 
22, 1991. The opinion is published in Crump v. Crump, 174 Utah Adv. 
Rpts. 20 (C.A. 11/22/91) • A copy of the opinion is included in the 
appendix, and will be referred to as the "Opinion" hereinafter. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Rule 45, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and jurisdiction is further shown as 
follows: 
A* The date of entry of the decision sought to be 
reviewed is November 22, 1991. 
B. This Court granted an Order for Extension of Time 
on December 19, 1991, as per the Honorable Richard C. Howe. 
No Motion for rehearing was requested. 
C. This is the initial Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
D# This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision 
in question by Writ of Certiorari by virtue of the 
Constitution of Utah, Article 8, Section 1, et. seq., Section 
78-2-1 et. seq., Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, and Rules 
45 and 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
i. The specific consideration governing 
review of certiorari pursuant to Rule 46f Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, is subparagraph (d)# 
"When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state, or federal 
law which has not been, but should be, settled by 
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the Supreme Court." The dismissal of the appeal 
and the entire case for lack of jurisdiction under 
the facts of the case appears to be an incident of 
first impression in Utah and was strongly 
dissented to by Judge Leonard H. Russon. 
ii. Respondent further believes that the 
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals is not 
consistent with other decisions of the Court of 
Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court, and has so far 
departed from the stated purposes of the UCCJA and 
PKPA as adopted by the Utah State Legislature and 
the Congress of the United States, respectively, 
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's 
power of supervision. (Judge Russon, in his 
dissenting opinion, further suggests that review 
by writ of certiorari may be necessary to resolve 
the controversy. See Opinion, footnote 18, p. 24) 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction involves the 
Court of Appeals' interpretation of the UCCJA, Section 78-45c-l, et. 
seq., Utah Code Ann., and the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A (1989). 
The pertinent provisions of each of those controlling statutes are set 
forth in the appendix. In addition, though not addressed in the 
Opinion, Respondent believes the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Section 78-
22a-l, et. seq., is also important in this action. The applicable 
provisions thereof are also included in the appendix. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. This appeal was from the final Order of 
Judge Gordon J. Low, denying Robert Crump's Petition to Modify a 
Montana Custody Order. Carolyn Crump, n/k/a Carolyn Forsgren, 
hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Crump, filed a Counter Petition to 
Modify the same Order to grant her sole custody of the children, to 
increase child support, and obtain a judgment for back child support. 
There was no cross appeal of the District Court's Order denying Mrs. 
Crump's Counter Petition. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the 
appeal and underlying petition for lack of jurisdiction since Mr. Crump 
continues to reside in Montana, even though Mr. Crump filed this action 
in Utah. 
B* COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. Mrs. Crump moved from Montana to Utah 
on or about September 1983. The parties were granted a Decree of 
Divorce by a Montana District Court on December 7, 1983. In August, 
1985, the Montana District Court awarded Mr. and Mrs. Crump joint legal 
custody of the children with primary physical custody awarded to Mrs. 
Crump. 
In February of 1989, Mr. Crump filed the Montana Custody Decree in 
the First District Court of Utah, in and for Cache County, pursuant to 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Section 78-22a-l, et. seq., Utah Code 
Annotated. Notice of the Foreign Judgment was delivered to Mrs. Crump 
by the Clerk of the District Court. At or about the saiae time, Mr. 
Crump filed a Petition to Modify the Montana Decree in Utah, requesting 
the Utah court to award him custody of the parties' four (4) children. 
Trial was held before the Honorable Gordon J. Low on April 24, and 
May 4, 1990. The Findings, Conclusions, and Order were entered by 
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Judge Low on June 12, 1990, with an Amended Order entered on July 16, 
1990. The initial appeal was filed on July 13, 1990. There was no 
cross-appeal. 
After briefs had been completed, oral argument on Mr. Crump's 
appeal was scheduled for August 27, 1991. However, approximately three 
(3) weeks prior to oral argument, the Court of Appeals notified counsel 
for each party of a possible jurisdictional infirmity and requested 
responses from each party. (See appendix, letter from Mary T. Noonan 
dated August 6, 1991.) Mrs. Crump argued . in favor of Utah's 
jurisdiction. Ironically, Mr. Crump argued that Utah did not have 
jurisdiction even though he had filed his petition in Utah. 
On August 26, 1991, the day prior to oral argument, the Court of 
Appeals informed counsel that oral argument had been canceled and a 
written decision would be issued. 
The Utah Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction by its Opinion and Order entered on November 22, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The marriage of the parties was dissolved by a Decree of the 
District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District of Montana in and for 
the County of Lake on December 7, 1983. (R.10) At the time the Decree 
was entered, Mrs. Crump was a resident of Utah, having moved to Utah in 
or about September 1983. (R. Vol II, p. 10-12) 
2. The parties by agreement disposed of their property and 
marital debts which was approved by the Montana District Court by a 
Supplemental Decree issued on or about April 6, 1984. 
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3. A hearing regarding permanent custody, child support, and 
attorney's fees was held before Judge Robert M. Holter, District Judge, 
on June 6, 1985. The Court heard testimony and interviewed the parties 
four (4) minor children. The Montana Court thereafter issued a 
Judgment of custody and visitation on August 19, 1985, awarding the 
parties joint custody with the primary residence of the children being 
with Carolyn during the school year and with Defendant/Appellant, 
Robert Crump during the summer vacation. 
4. At the time the Custody Decree was issued, Mrs. Crump and the 
children had been living in Utah for approximately two (2) years. 
5. Mr. Crump filed an authenticated copy of the Montana Decree 
of Divorce in the First Judicial District Court, County of Cache, State 
of Utah, in or about February 1989, under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act 
and provided notice pursuant to the Act to Mrs. Crump. Mr. Crump also 
filed a Petition to Modify the Montana Decree of Divorce and served the 
same upon Mrs. Crump. 
6. The children had been living in Utah approximately 5 1/2 
years at the time the Petition to Modify Decree was filed and it had 
been approximately 3 1/2 years since the entry of the Montana Custody 
Decree. 
7. The hearing on Defendant's Petition to Modify was held before 
Judge Gordon J. Low, District Judge, on April 24, and May 4, 1990. 
Judge Low issued his Memorandum Decision May 16, 1990, refusing to 
modify the custody provisions of the Montana Decree and slightly 
altering the visitation provisions of the Decree. Judge Low also 
modified the child support provisions of the Decree. 
(R. 277-287) 
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8. As of this date, the children have resided in Utah for more 
than eight (8) years and it has been almost six and one-half years (6 
1/2) years since the entry of the Montana Custody Decree. 
9. Mr. Crump continues to reside in Montana. 
ARGUMENT 
UTAH HAS CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
OVER THE PARTIES AND THE SUBJECT 
MATTER IN THIS ACTION AND SHOULD 
EXERCISE ITS JURISDICTION. 
The Opinion and Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the 
Utah Action for lack of jurisdiction is a split decision with a strong 
dissent by Judge Leonard H. Russon. The majority, as authored by Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, with a concurrence by Judge Reginal W. Garff, 
essentially contends that no concurrent jurisdiction exists in 
considering a modification of an existing out of state child custody 
decree. The majority contends that pursuant to the UCCJA and the PKPA, 
in order for Utah to have jurisdiction to modify the Montana Decree in 
this action, either none of the parties must remain a resident of the 
Decree state, i.e. Montana, or the Montana Court must enter an Order 
deferring its jurisdiction to Utah. Without one of those two 
conditions, claims the majority, Utah does not and never will have 
jurisdiction. 
The dissenting opinion, which is supported by Mrs. Crump, contends 
that since the children have resided in Utah for a period in excess of 
six consecutive months (in this case, more than eight years), Utah is 
the home state as defined in Section 78-45c-3, Utah Code Ann. (1987), 
and therefore, has concurrent jurisdiction. The determination the Utah 
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Court must make when and if considering jurisdiction is WHETHER TO 
EXERCISE that jurisdiction. Judge Russon contends that Utah has 
jurisdiction in the case at bar and that Utah should also exercise its 
jurisdiction, especially where Mr. Crump has filed his Petition in Utah 
and has proceeded in Utah without any objection or concern about Utah's 
jurisdiction, until, of course, the issue was first raised by the Court 
of Appeals. 
In considering the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, it should be 
stressed that Mr. Crump voluntarily filed his petition to modify the 
Montana Decree in Utah and neither Judge Low nor counsel, including 
current counsel, even considered the possibility of a jurisdictional 
defect, let alone raise the issue. Simply put, this is not a 
jurisdictional dispute between the parties. Jurisdiction was first 
raised as a potential issue only three (3) weeks prior to scheduled 
oral argument being held. 
A. REVIEW OF THE MAJORITY POSITION. 
Each of the Utah cases cited by the majority was brought to the 
Court of Appeals as a jurisdictional dispute. In Curtis v. Curtis, 789 
P.2d 717, (Utah App. 1990) the original Decree was issued by Utah's 
Fourth District Court on December 4, 1987. Approximately two months 
later, Mr. Curtis took the children from Utah to Mississippi on an 
alleged visitation and then refused to return the children. After 
filing two (2) petitions in Mississippi seeking to modify the Utah 
Decree, Mr. Curtis was finally able to obtain a custody order in 
Mississippi. 
Although a Utah Fourth District Court Domestic Relations 
Commissioner had concluded that Mississippi did not have jurisdiction 
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to modify the divorce decree because Utah had never relinquished 
jurisdiction, and had recommended against enforcement of the 
Mississippi order and in favor of issuing a restraining order against 
Mr. Curtis, neither the Mississippi Court nor the Utah Court followed 
that recommendation. Prior to his decision, the Utah District Judge, 
who had entered the initial Utah Decree, conferred by telephone with 
the Mississippi judge. And even though both Courts recognized that 
only one court had authority to exercise jurisdiction over the Divorce 
Decree, the Utah Court concluded that since Mrs. Curtis had made a 
"general appearance" in Mississippi during a three day hearing in 
February 1988, she had submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the 
Mississippi Court. The District Court thereupon dismissed Mrs. 
Curtis's Order to Show Cause and granted Mr. Curtis's motion to enforce 
the Mississippi order. 
Upon appeal, the decision of the district judge was set aside 
since Utah had jurisdiction and continued to have jurisdiction as long 
as Mrs. Curtis continued to reside in Utah. 
In State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 118, (Utah App. 1990), 
the parties resided in Florida at the time the Divorce Decree was 
entered. The Mother had moved with the children to Utah and then moved 
to California during the pendency of the Utah action. Father sought to 
have the Decree modified in Utah, while mother was still in Utah, only 
two (2) weeks after the entry of the final decree in Florida. Even 
though the Utah Juvenile Court had communicated with the Florida Court 
and each had agreed Florida retained modification jurisdiction, the 
Utah Court proceeded on a dependency and neglect hearing and granted 
custody to the Father. The Court of Appeals ruled that since Father 
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continued to reside in Florida, and mother did not reside in Utah, 
jurisdiction continued in Florida and Utah had no jurisdiction to 
modify the Decree. 
The majority opinion does not cite a case in which an appellate 
court for the first time considered the issue of jurisdiction. Each of 
the cases referred to in the majority opinion dealt with a dispute in 
the trial court as to the Court's jurisdiction and, for the most part, 
those cases were properly decided in conformity with the purposes and 
provisions of the UCCJA and the PKPA. The majority appears, therefore, 
to anchor its opinion on the assumption that the PKPA differs from the 
UCCJA in that the PKPA allegedly "anchors exclusive continuing 
jurisdiction to modify a previous custody decree in the original home 
state as long as the child or one of the contestants remains in that 
state," citing Annotation, 83 A.L.R. 4th 742 at 748 (emphasis in 
Opinion). 
The applicable section of the PKPA states as follows: 
(f) A court of a state may modify a determination of the 
custody of the same child made by a court of another state if 
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child 
custody determination; and 
(2) the court of the other state no longer has 
jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such 
jurisdiction to modify such determination. 
28 U.S.C. Section 1738A(f) 1989. 
The corresponding provision in the UCCJA dealing with modification 
of foreign decrees is found in Section 78-45c-14, U.C.A., and states as 
follows: 
(1) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, 
the court of this state shall not modify that decree unless 
(a) it appears to the court of this state that the court 
which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction 
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under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in 
accordance with this act or has declined to assume 
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the court of this 
state has jurisdiction. 
It appears to this writer that the only difference between the two 
sections is that the UCCJA adds "under jurisdictional prerequisites 
substantially in accordance with this act," in determining if the 
decree state still has jurisdiction. In other words, both provisions 
require the modification state to determine if the decree state still 
has jurisdiction. Both also recognize that jurisdiction may be 
concurrent since the PKPA allows the modifying state to exercise its 
jurisdiction if the decree state has "declined to exercise such 
jurisdiction." However, both are very clear that if the decree state 
still has jurisdiction, which is a question which should be considered 
by both courts in consultation with each other considering the best 
interests of the child, and has not deferred or declined that 
jurisdiction, the modifying state may not exercise its jurisdiction. 
It also appears quite clear, contrary to the assumption of the 
majority, that the PKPA does not create jurisdiction, but merely 
directs or limits the exercise of jurisdiction. "A child custody 
determination made by a court of this state is consistent with the 
provisions of this section only if - (1) such court has jurisdiction 
under the law of such state;" 28 U.S.C. Section 1738a(c)(l). The PKPA 
also includes: 
(g) a court of a state shall not exercise jurisdiction in 
any proceeding for a custody determination commenced during 
the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another state 
where such court of that other state is exercising 
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jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section 
to make a custody determination. 
28 U.S.C. Section 1738a(g) 
The PKPA, therefore, from the clear language of the act, 
recognizes that each state, under its own state laws, may have 
jurisdiction over the decree. Jurisdiction in Utah is established 
pursuant to Section 30-3-1 et. seq., Utah Code Ann. and the Utah UCCJA, 
78-45c-l, et. seq., Utah Code Ann. 
Our courts have also previously recognized the possibility of 
concurrent jurisdiction: 
The unilateral filing of a petition in one state does not 
prohibit the filing of a petition in another state which also 
has jurisdiction. Peterson v. Peterson, 464 A. 2nd, 202, 205 
(Me. 1983). But more importantly, the purpose of Section 78-
45c-6(l) "is to encourage judicial restraint in exercising 
jurisdiction whenever another state appears to be in a better 
position to determine custody of a child" 9 UCCJA (U.L.A.) 
Section 7, Comment, 234 (1988). Ultimately, it is -less 
important which court exercises jurisdiction but that courts 
of several states involved act in partnership to bring about 
the best possible solution for a child's future." 9 UCCJA 
(U.L.A.) preferatory note, 118 (1988) (emphasis added in 
opinion) [citations omitted] 
W.D. , In Re: v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Utah App. 1989), 
The majority also suggests that Mrs. Crump argued that 
jurisdiction automatically shifted to Utah, the new home state, when 
she and the children moved there. That assumption is incorrect. Mrs. 
Crump merely argues, as does Judge Russon in the dissenting opinion, 
that Utah has concurrent jurisdiction and has the riglit to determine 
whether to exercise that jurisdiction. Although Mr. Crump could very 
well have filed his Petition in Montana, which would &ave required a 
response in Montana, (which response may have included a request for 
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the Montana court to defer jurisdiction to Utah on a finding of 
inconvenient forum pursuant to Section 7 of the UCCJA), Mr. Crump chose 
to proceed with his Petition in Utah and file the Montana Decree in 
Utah as a foreign judgment entitled to full faith and credit, thereby 
effectively waiving any objection to Utah's authority to exercise its 
jurisdiction. 
B. REVIEW OF THE DISSENTING POSITION. 
Mrs. Crump believes that the arguments of the dissenting opinion 
are far better suited to the instant action than the arguments raised 
by the majority. Although this writer does not purport to assume that 
he can improve on Judge Russon's opinion, and refers this Court to 
Judge Russon's dissent and the excellent analysis and arguments made 
therein, Mrs. Crump would like to provide some additional information 
to this Court. 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Russon mentions that the Crump 
children have been in Utah for over two years. Actually, the children 
have been in Utah since September 1983, which is now over eight years. 
Although the children have visited with their father in Montana during 
the summers and other periods, the substantial evidence relating to 
their past, present, and future care, training, and protection is in 
Utah. 
All of the applicable provisions of the PKPA and UCCJA favor Utah 
exercising jurisdiction. For example, each of the factors enumerated 
in Section 7(3) of the UCCJA in determining the most convenient forum 
favors Utah. Those factors are as follows: 
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court 
shall consider if it is in the interest of the child that 
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another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may 
take into account the following factors, among others: 
(a) if another state is or recently was the 
child's home state; 
(b) if another state has a closer connection with 
the child and his family or with the child and one 
or more of the contestants; 
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the 
child's present or future care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships is more 
readily available in another state; 
(d) if the parties have agreed on another forum 
which is no less appropriate; and 
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of 
this state would contravene any of the purposes 
stated in Section 78-45c-l. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45c-7(3) (1980). 
In applying those factors to the instant action: 
(a) Home State. Since the children have been residing in 
Utah now for approximately 8 years, Utah is clearly the 
children's home state. 
(b) Close Connections. Although the children spend summer 
visitation with their father in Montana, the majority of 
their time is spent in Utah. Their teachers reside in Utah 
as well as other family members, friends, religious 
instructors, medical providers, and other people who are 
familiar with the children. 
(c) Substantial Evidence. Since Utah law requires Mr. Crump 
to show a substantial and material change in Mrs. Crump's 
circumstances and ONLY as those circumstances impact on her 
parenting ability and the functioning of the custodial 
relationship, the court is able to only hear testimony and 
first determine if there has been a material change in 
circumstance on Mrs. Crump's circumstances before considering 
the children's best interests since this was originally a 
contested, litigated custody matter. The only evidence the 
court can hear regarding the children's present and future 
care, protection, training, and personal relationships is 
available in Utah. 
(d) Agreement of Parties. The parties have obviously agreed 
on Utah as being the most appropriate forum to proceed in 
this action. 
14 
(e) Purpose of Act. The purposes of the act would be 
defeated if Montana were to retain jurisdiction in lieu of 
deferring jurisdiction to Utah. 
The stated purposes of the UCCJA also almost exclusively support 
jurisdiction being exercised in Utah. Those factors are: 
(a) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with 
courts of other states in matters of child custody which have 
in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state 
to state with harmful effects on their well-being; 
(b) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to 
the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which 
can best decide the case in the interests of the child; 
(c) assure that litigation concerning the custody of the 
child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child 
and his family have the closest connection and where 
significant evidence concerning his care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships is most readily 
available, and that courts of this state decline the exercise 
of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer 
connection with another state; 
(d) discourage continuing controversies over child custody 
in the interest of greater stability of home environment and 
of secure family relationships for the child; 
(e) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of 
children undertaken to obtain custody awards; 
(f) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states 
and this state in so far as feasible; 
(g) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other 
states; 
(h) promote and expand the exchange of information and other 
forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state 
and those of other states concerned with the same child; and 
(i) to make uniform the law of those states which it acted. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45c-1. 
As included in the appendix, the purposes of the PKPA are also 
very similar to the purposes of the UCCJA. By ruling that Utah does 
not have jurisdiction and dismissing the action, the majority opinion 
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is showing callous disregard for the purposes of the PKPA and the UCCJA 
in favor of its strict and rigid interpretation of one provision of the 
PKPA. The Court of Appeals has now caused a jurisdictional conflict 
rather than seeking to avoid a jurisdictional conflict where none 
existed. The Court of Appeals has given no concern to discussion 
between Utah and Montana in order to determine which state can best 
decide the case in the interest of the children. The Court of Appeals 
decision may also require that litigation concerning custody of the 
children take place in the state which has the least significant 
connections concerning their care, protection, and training and where 
the least evidence is available. Although Mrs. Crump may further 
petition Montana to defer its jurisdiction to Utah, (should Mr. Crump 
proceed with an action in Montana), even if Montana defers its 
jurisdiction to Utah as the most convenient forum the Court of Appeals 
has assured that the controversy over the custody of these children 
will continue, causing a substantial impact on the stability of their 
home environment and their family relationship. The Court of Appeals 
has also essentially assured that re-litigation will occur requiring 
the children to again be submitted to the unfortunate emotional trauma 
surrounding such on-going litigation. 
Rather than allow such egregious circumstances to continue, this 
Court should grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and overrule the 
decision of the Court of Appeals and confirm the jurisdiction of tjhe 
Utah Courts. If the decision is upheld, Mr. Crump essentially is 
offered another bite at the apple through no fault of Mrs. Crump, the 
trial judge, or her trial counsel. 
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C. ALTERNATIVE ACTION. 
As an alternative to either affirming or setting aside the 
Opinion, this Court can also allow communication between the Courts of 
Utah and Montana to resolve any jurisdictional problem. One of the 
most important purposes of both the PKPA and the UCCJA, as noted in the 
decisions cited by both the majority and dissenting opinions, is to 
require the courts of each of the states to communicate with one 
another in an effort to determine which court is better suited to 
exercise its jurisdiction. As pointed out in Justice Stewart's 
dissenting opinion in Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985), 
courts should generally communicate with each other prior to rendering 
any decisions. 
In the instant action, there was no need to communicate with 
Montana since the question of jurisdiction was not an issue, either for 
the parties or the Court. Now that jurisdiction has been made an issue 
by the Court of Appeals, a most reasonable approach, short of reversing 
the Court of Appeals decision and holding that Utah does have 
jurisdiction, is for this action to be remanded to the trial court for 
a determination of whether jurisdiction should be exercised. The Utah 
Court can then communicate with the Montana court regarding 
jurisdiction. And, if Montana is so inclined, Judge Low can supplement 
and/or correct the original record pursuant to Rule 60(a), U.R.C.P., to 
include a finding that Montana has deferred its jurisdiction to Utah 
(if such is the case) and enter an Order regarding jurisdiction. 
Such a procedure was conducted in Dennis v. Dennis,, 366 N.W. 2nd, 
474 (N.D. 1985), as reported in 83 A.L.R. 4th 742, 765: 
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Although it was undisputed that a father was a contestant in 
a custody dispute and continued to reside in North Dakotaf 
the court in Dennis v. Dennis, (1985, N.D.) 366 N.W. 2nd, 
474, held that North Dakota did not meet the requirements for 
continuing jurisdiction over the father's motion to modify 
the original North Dakota custody decree under 28 U.S.C.S. 
Section 1738A(d), where Iowa, not North Dakota, was currently 
the children's home state, and it was impossible to determine 
from the trial court's order if it had considered whether it 
had jurisdiction under Section 3(a)(2) of the UCCJA, since 
continued residency of the father in North Dakota was alone 
insufficient to establish continuing jurisdiction. The Court 
accordingly reversed and remanded the trial court's dismissal 
of the father's motion for a redetermination of the 
jurisdictional issue. The original Decree awarded the mother 
custody of the children and granted the father reasonable 
rights of visitation, with alternative visitation provided 
which was to become effective upon the anticipated move of 
the mother and children to Iowa, which occurred about a month 
later. About three years later, the father filed his request 
to modify the visitation provisions of the original decree. 
Rejecting the father's argument that the PKPA required the 
trial court to assume jurisdiction because he was a 
contestant who currently resided in North Dakota, the court 
observed that in order for a North Dakota court to assume 
modification jurisdiction under section 1738A(d), the North 
Dakota court must currently meet the jurisdiction 
requirements of section 3(a) of the UCCJA. The couirt noted 
that subsequent to entry of an original custody decree by the 
child's home state, another state can become the home state 
and can obtain jurisdiction to modify the other state's 
original decree. The court pointed out that the 
determination of whether the trial court had significant 
connection jurisdiction was a question which should be 
determined by the trial court. 
On remand, the trial court determined that it had signAficant 
connection jurisdiction under Section 3(a)(2), but declined 
to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 7 because Iowa was 
a more appropriate forum for litigating the father's motion, 
and that decision was upheld in Dennis v. Dennis (19$S> N.D.) 
387 N.W. 2d 234. 
The authors of the A.L.R. Annotation (which is quoted by the 
majority for the proposition that the PKPA anchors exclusive continuing 
jurisdiction to modify a previous custody decree in the original home 
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state as long as the child or one of the contestants remains in that 
state) further point out: 
This preference [of exclusive decree state modification 
jurisdiction] has been criticized by some for being arguably 
arbitrary, capricious, and somewhat anomalous since it 
differs from the UCCJA. [See Foster, "Child Custody 
Jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, " 27 NY Law School L. Rev. 297 
(1981).] Others view it more favorably, noting that it 
establishes a threshold criterion for continuing 
jurisdiction, which may prevent a rendering state from 
abusing the concept that its jurisdiction, once exercised, 
continues to the exclusion of all other states. [See Coombs, 
"Interstate Child Custody, Jurisdiction, Recognition, and 
Enforcement," 66 Minn. L. Rev. 711 (June, 1982)] One way 
around the unfortunate rigidity created by 1738A(d) is self-
restraint and commitment to the objectives of the UCCJA and 
the PKPA, including the provisions for declining 
jurisdiction. 
83 A.L.R. 4th 742 at 748. 
The majority would do well to take note of the unfortunate 
consequences of its rigid position in dismissing this action, (which 
was filed in 1989, requiring two days of hearing and which has already 
taken a substantial financial and emotional toll on all parties 
involved) in favor of self-restraint and a commitment to the purposes 
of the UCCJA and PKPA, which almost exclusively favor Utah exercising 
its jurisdiction in this matter. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Since the effects of the Court of Appeals decision are far more 
reaching than this case, this Court should carefully examine the 
decision of the Court of Appeals and allow the parties to present their 
arguments to the Court prior to any final determination. As pointed 
out earlier, the Court of Appeals heard no argument from the parties 
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and only allowed approximately ten days for the parties to submit 
memoranda on a jurisdictional issue the parties had no idea existed 
until three (3) weeks prior to scheduled oral argument. 
Plaintiff/Respondent respectfully requests this Court to grant 
this Petition for Writ of Certiorari to consider the correctness of the 
Court of Appeals' decision in dismissing this action for lack of 
jurisdiction or to consider other alternative action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 7 day of January, 1992 
Step^ehJW^ Jewell, J 
Attorrusftyfor 
PlainxOr /Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI were mailed, postage pre-paid , this / 7 day of 
Januaryf 1992, to Robert A. Echard, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 
at 635 - 25th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
^AJU£(7 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Robert Crump appeals the lower court's denial of his 
petition to modify a Montana court's award of joint custody to 
him and Carolyn Crump, of their four children. We dismiss the 
appeal. 
FACTS 
Mr. and Mrs. Crump were granted a decree of divorce on 
December 7, 1983, by a Montana district court. Prior to a 
hearing on the issue of child custody, Mrs. Crump moved with the 
parties' four children from Montana to Utah. In August 1985, the 
Montana district court awarded Mr. Crump and Mrs. Crump joint 
legal custody of the children, with primary physical custody 
awarded to Mrs. Crump. In February 1989, Mr. Crump filed a 
petition in Utah to modify the Montana custody decree. The 
petition alleged a material change of circumstances, and urged 
that Mr. Crump be awarded primary physical custody of the 
children. Mr. Crump resided in Montana at the time he filed his 
petition, and has been a resident of that state at all times 
relevant to the present case. On April 24 and May 4 of 1990, the 
trial court in Utah heard evidence and denied the petition to 
modify the prior custody decree. However, the court made a 
slight change in the visitation provisions and modified the child 
support provisions of that decree. 
Mr. Crump appeals the trial court's denial of his petition 
to modify the custody order. On appeal, Mr. Crump raises three 
issues, claiming: (1) the trial court committed error in applying 
the standard for reviewing a petition to modify a child custody 
award; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in not modifying 
the award; and (3) the trial court committed error in failing to 
admit certain evidence. 
JURISDICTION 
A threshold issue is whether or not this court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. If a court l^^^s_n^rJ.sdiction 
"it has not power to entertain the suit. ft^S!^^P^^^g^^fciB*f T^ 9 
P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) (citation Omitted). Not only can 
a court not entertain the suit, the parties cannot cure the 
jurisdictional defect by waiver or consent. Mrs. Crump's 
argument, and the dissent's assertion that because "Mr. Crump 
voluntarily and affirmatively engaged the Utah courts . . . he 
waived any question regarding authority of the Utah courts to 
decide the issue . . . and has thus waived any objection to the 
district court's authority to exercise its jurisdiction," is 
without merit. We have held that 
while defects in personal jurisdiction can be 
waived, subject matter jurisdiction goes to 
the very power of a court to entertain an 
action. A lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor 
cured by a waiver. A lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time and 
when subject matter jurisdiction does not 
exist, neither the parties nor the court can 
do anything to fill that void. 
Id» (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The issue of waiver 
has been addressed by this court, see id., by our supreme court, 
and by the federal courts of appeal. See, e.g. , JS^^PaaUd v. 
JwnmM*nWFY?Z& 146^ 5, 1484-85 Ulth Cir.i , cert, ^ denied by 
S E E I J L ^ ^ T^^) (NO 
waiver of jurisdictional defect in modification of child custody 
case even where father had consented to jurisdiction of 
Washington court, which court did not.l^ ave jurisdiction); AZ3V* 
Mad**? ' f & T i r r ^ t B i t t o i m t x ^ Co. . Inc. I 817 P. 2d 323, 325 (Utah 
1991) (fl[A]cquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on the court, and a lack of jurisdiction can be 
raised by the court or either party at any time."); see also 
Annotation, Child Custody: When Does State That Issued Previous 
Custody Determination Have Continuing Jurisdiction Under Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) Or Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS S 1738A, 83 A.L.R.4th 742, 748 
(1991) [hereinafter Annotation] (citation omitted) ("[SJubject 
matter jurisdiction under [the relevant child custody statutes] 
cannot be vested by agreement of the parties, even though all of 
the parties desire an adjudication on the merits, and such 
jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the court by a party's 
failure to interpose a timely objection to the court's assumption 
of jurisdiction."). Therefore, we must determine if, under the 
applicable statutes, the courts of this state have jurisdiction 
to modify the Montana child custody award, and not ignore this 
issue on the basis of waiver simply because Mr. Crump came to 
Utah to initiate the action. 
A. Jurisdiction under the PKPA 
Congress adopted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 
(PKPA), the jurisdictional provisions of which are codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1738A (1989), to create a national standard that the 
states could look to in interstate child custody disputes. See 
generally Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-611, § 7, (1980), 94 Stat. 3569. The PKPA was created in part 
to solve problems that the Uniform Child Custody Jyyc^djjqtion Act 
(UCCJA) had not successfully addressed. S$^^WWMY&&£»6f 
^gP^g^^^^jj^Ppipl^^^^ 1990) (citations omitted) 
"Wfierer tht PRParinff tM^s€aT€e''V version of the UCCJA conflict, 
the PKPA preempts state law." Xd. (citations omitted). Because 
the PKPA "directly address the issues before this court, creates 
a very manageable two-prong test for determining modification 
jurisdiction, and would govern in the event of conflict with the 
UCCJA or oizher srate law,1' Curtis, 789 P.2d at 720, we focus our 
analysis on this federal statute. 
One problem that the UCCJA failed to address was a specific 
prov^j^Qpi^or continuing jurisdiction. Annotation, ff^S^^E^ttte 
g^BHMK^T h e r e f o r e/ t h e potential existed for concurrent^^"^ 
1. In the present case, the result is the same under the UCCJA 
and the PKPA, although the PKPA uses language more specific than 
the UCCJA in addressing jurisdiction in the modification context. 
2. "However, the provisions of § 14 of the UCCJA, along with the 
Commissioners' Notes to that section, have been interpreted to 
(continued...) 
jurisdiction between two states. Dickens, The Parental 
Kidnapping Act: Application and Interpretation, 23 J. Fam. L. 
419, 426-27 (1984-85) [hereinafter Dickens]. The PKPA eliminates 
"the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction by conferring 
exclusive modification jurisdiction upon the home state of the 
child (i.e., the state which rendered the initial decree)." Id. 
at 426 (citing The Effect of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention 
Act of 1980 on Child Snatching, 17 New Eng. L. Rev. 499, 511 
(Spring 1982)). 
Unlike the UCCJA, the PKPA "anchors exclusive continuing 
jurisdiction to modify a previous custody decree in the original 
home state as long as the child or one of the contestants remains 
in that state." Annotation, 83 A.L.R.4th at 748 (emphasis 
added). See also Dickens, 23 J. Fam. L. at 426. "While under 
the UCCJA scheme some states profess to find modification 
jurisdiction so long as they can properly exercise initial 
custody jurisdiction, the PKPA prevents a second state from 
modifying an initial state's order except in carefully 
circumscribed situations." iJfi^ ^^ Hlj^ gJ^ ^^ ^^ p^ pf^ ^^ H^ a^il^ y^ ^^ ''"T473 . 1476 
(4th Cir. 1987). This is clear^'fgtftr&gctiairXTf^oT^nie PKPA 
which states that 
A court of a State may modify a 
determination of the custody of the same 
child made by a court of another State, if — 
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a 
child custody determination; and 
(2) the court of the other State no 
longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined 
to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such 
determination. 
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1989) (emphasis added). 
This section explicitly limits when a state, which would 
otherwise have jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, must 
defer to the state which originally issued the custody order.3 
"The PKPA is a departure from the jurisdictional requirements of 
the UCCJA and this departure is critical to the efficacy of the 
2. (...continued) 
establish exclusive continuing jurisdiction of the state that 
made the initial custody determination." Annotation, 83 
A.L.R.4th at 748. 
3. Specifically the PKPA provides that states shall not modify 
custody orders of another state "except as provided in subsection 
(f) of this section," 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1989). 
A 
new Act because a state court may no longer modify existing 
decrees of other states pursuant to the various and flexible 
bases of jurisdiction provided in the UCCJA." Dickens, 23 J. 
Fam. L. at 426. Further, this court has held "the language [of 
the PKPA] clearly eliminates the possibility of concurrent 
jurisdiction by conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon the state 
which rendered the initial decree[.]" State in Interest of 
D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 129. See also Dickens, 23 J. Fam. L. at 426-
27 (PKPA precludes a state court to modify existing decrees of 
other states when state which issued decree maintains 
jurisdiction). 
In the present case, both prongs of the jurisdictional test 
must be addressed. While a state may "have jurisdiction to make 
such a child custody determination[,] . . ."28 U.S.C. § 1738A 
(1989), it must decline to exercise that jurisdiction unless "the 
court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has 
declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such 
determination." Id.4 While Utah may have had jurisdiction to 
issue the original order in this case, e.g., meeting the 
requirements of subsection (1), Utah does not have jurisdiction 
to modify an order from Montana because Montana has continuing 
exclusive jurisdiction. 
B. Jurisdiction under the UCCJA 
The decision we have reached conforms with comparable 
provisions of the UCCJA. The UCCJA was created to "avoid 
jurisdiction competition and conflict with courts of other states 
in matters of child custody," Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-1 (1987), 
"promote cooperation with the courts of other states," id.. 
4. See also Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(Virginia trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over 
modification of custody case as Virginia had continuing and 
exclusive jurisdiction); McDouaald v. Jenson. 786 F.2d 1465, 1481 
(11th Cir.), cert, denied by Jenson v. McDouaald, 479 U.S. 860, 
107 S. Ct. 207 (1986) (no question that under PKPA, Florida, the 
state which issued initial custody decree, and not Washington, 
where mother and child later resided, maintained and properly 
exercised jurisdiction to modify custody decree); Appleaate v. 
Gant, 460 So.2d 1293, 1294 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (Alabama court 
had no jurisdiction to modify Texas custody decree where under 
PKPA state issuing original decree retains exclusive 
jurisdiction); TOgarBS-Vi-Wright. 9& N.M* 8, 644 P.2d 522, 524 
ffffft (PKPA precluded modification of Utalr custody decree by New 
Mexico where first prong of test was met but second prong was not 
met) . 
litigate custody where the child and family 
have the closest connections and where 
significant evidence concerning the child is 
most readily available, discourage conflict 
over custody, deter abductions and unilateral 
removals of children, avoid relitigation of 
another stated custody rulings, and promote 
the exchange of information and mutual 
assistance between different states[,] 
State in Interest of D.S.K.. 792 P.2d 118, 123 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-1 (1987)), or put more 
succinctly, "to bring some semblance of order into the existing 
chaos." Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction 
and Continuing Jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 14 Fam. L.Q. 203, 
214 (1981) [hereinafter Bodenheimer] (quoting UCCJA, 
Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 114 (1979)). All fifty 
states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UCCJA. 
As to when a court in this state has jurisdiction over a 
particular child custody matter, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l) 
(1987) provides: 
A court of this state which is competent 
to decide child custody matters has 
jurisdiction to make a child custody 
determination by initial or modification 
decree if the conditions as set forth in any 
of the following paragraphs are met: 
(a) This state (i) is the home state of 
the child at the commencement of the 
proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home 
state within six months before commencement 
of the proceeding and the child is absent 
from this state because of his removal or 
retention by a person claiming his custody or 
for other reasons, and a parent or person 
acting as parent continues to live in this 
state; 
(b) It is in the best interest of the 
child that a court of this state assume 
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his 
parents, or the child and at least one 
contestant, have a significant connection 
with this state, and (ii) there is available 
in this state substantial evidence concerning 
the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal 
relationships; 
(c) The child is physically present in 
this state and (i) the child has been 
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an 
emergency to protect the child because he has 
been subjected to or threatened with 
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise 
neglected or dependent; or 
(d)(i) It appears that no other state 
would have jurisdiction under prerequisites 
substantially in accordance with Paragraphs 
(a), (b), or (c), or another has declined to 
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this 
state is the more appropriate forum to 
determine the custody of the child, and (ii) 
it is in the best interest of the child that 
this court assume jurisdiction. 
In the present case, under subsection (a), Utah is the home 
state5 of the children. However, the analysis does not end at 
determining whether these jurisdictional requirements are met. 
Section 78-45c-14(l) (1987)6 sets forth under what circumstances 
a court in Utah may modify an out-of-state custody decree: 
(1) If a court of another state has made a 
custody decree, a court of this state shall 
not modify that decree unless (a) it appears 
to the court of this state that the court 
which rendered the decree does not now have 
jurisdiction under jurisdictional 
prerequisites substantially in accordance 
with this act or has declined to assume 
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the 
court of this state has jurisdiction. 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-2 defines "home state11 as "the state 
in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived 
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at 
least six consecutive months . . . ." 
6. While this court has decided jurisdictional disputes under 
the UCCJA without regard to section 14, see, e.g., Rawlings^v. 
Weiner. 752 P.2d fin (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 
(Utah 1988), we believe that such questions are more easily 
answered by focusing on this section. See, e.g.T Rawlings, 752 
P.2d at 1330-31 (Bench, J., concurring). 
(Emphasis added). Under this section, both the requirements of 
subsections (1)(a) and (b) must be met before Utah can modify a 
decree from another state. Section 15 provides that the second 
state will enforce the decree of the initial state as long as the 
initial state retains custody jurisdiction. "When both states 
have adopted the VCCJA, the apparent effect of §§ 14 and 15 is to 
give continuing exclusive jurisdiction to the initial state as 
long as that state retains a significant connection' basis for 
jurisdiction." Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476-77 (4th Cir„ 
1987) . It makes no difference that Utah may have met the 
jurisdiction prerequisites of section 3; section 14 must also be 
satisfied in order for this state to modify the Montana award.8 
7. We note that subsection 14 contains language similar to that 
found in subsection (f) of the PKPA. While it was hoped that 
subsection 14 of the UCCJA would eliminate the erroneous 
assumption of concurrent jurisdiction, it proved to be an 
imperfect remedy. Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476 (4th Cir. 
1987); Bodenheimer, 14 Fam. L.Q. at 214. "While under the UCCJA 
scheme some states profess to find modification jurisdiction so 
long as they can properly exercise initial custody jurisdiction, 
the PKPA prevents a second state from modifying an initial 
state's order . . . ." Meade, 812 F.2d at 1476. 
8. To read section 3 of the UCCJA, which merely addresses under 
what circumstances a state may have jurisdiction, without the 
qualifying language of section 14, as the dissent would have us 
do, is to ignore the plain language of the Act. Scholars 
addressing this very issue have commented that prior to the 
UCCJA, "concurrent jurisdiction in several states to modify an 
existing custody judgment was a major cause of parental resort to 
kidnapping to gain a more favorable judgment in a new forum." 
Bodenheimer, 14 Fam. L.Q. at 213-14. Therefore, section 14 is 
the key provision to carry out the UCCJA's objective of 
preventing jurisdictional conflict. Xd. at 214. This is 
especially true, when as here, the question is not simply, does a 
particular state have jurisdiction to make a custody decree, but, 
does a particular state have jurisdiction to modify an existing 
custody decree of another state. 
While section 14 was overlooked by early cases under the 
UCCJA, see, e.g., Wheeler v. District Court. 186 Colo. 218, 526 
P.2d 658 (1974), and Howard v. Gish, 36 Md. App. 446, 373 A.2d 
1280 (1977), the majority of states, including Utah, now 
recognize the exclusive jurisdiction of the state which issued 
the original decree. See, e.g., State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 
P.2d at 128; Curtis, 789 P.2d at 724-25; Rawlinas v. Weiner, 752 
P.2d 1327, 1330-31 (Utah App.) (Bench, J., concurring), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). The dissent however, chooses 
(continued...) 
It is clear that in the case at bar, the requirement of 
subsection (1)(a) is not met. 
[T]he continuing jurisdiction of the prior 
court is exclusive. Other states do not have 
jurisdiction to modify the decree. They must 
respect and defer to th.e prior state's 
continuing jurisdiction. 
Exclusive continuing jurisdiction 
is not affected by the child's residence in 
another state for six months or more. 
Although the new state becomes the child's 
home state, significant connection 
jurisdiction continues in the state of the 
prior decree where the court record and other 
evidence exists and where one parent or 
another contestant continues to reside. Only 
when the child and all parties have moved 
away is deference to another state's 
continuing jurisdiction no longer required. 
Bodenheimer, 14 Fam. L.Q. at 214-15 (quoted in State in Interest 
of D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 124) (emphasis added). See also Rawlings 
v. Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327, 1330-31 (Utah App.) (Bench, J., 
concurring), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). "As long 
as the decree state retains jurisdiction there is no concurrent 
jurisdiction to modify a decree under the UCCJA," State in 
Interest of D.S.K.. 792 P.2d at 124 (citations omitted), and "as 
long as one parent continues to reside in the original state and 
maintains some contact with the child . . .[,]" Id. at 125, 
jurisdiction remains in the decree state. 
Mrs. Crump's argument that jurisdiction automatically 
shifted to Utah, the new home state, when she and the children 
moved there, is without merit. Mr. Crump continues to reside in 
Montana, where the original custody decree was issued. Montana 
has not relinquished jurisdiction, nor have the parties sought to 
have Montana do so. Instead, Mr. Crump chose to petition the 
8. (...continued) 
to ignore Utah case law, and relies instead upon cases from 
Indiana and Illinois to make the point that concurrent 
jurisdiction does exist. 
courts of Utah for a modification of custody.9 Therefore, under 
the UCCJA, Montana has continuing exclusive jurisdiction and has 
not declined to exercise its jurisdiction in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
While there is much confusion as to the applicability of the 
UCCJA and the PKPA in child custody modification proceedings, 
this is no excuse for counsel in these types of cases to totally 
ignore the law. In the present case, we have no choice but to 
dismiss the appeal because the courts of Utah do not have 
jurisdiction to modify the Montana decree. The dissent is 
disturbed that this result might require further proceedings. 
However, if the proper procedures had been followed at the 
outset, the dissent would have no basis for its complaint. 
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify Montana's 
custody decree, we dismiss the appeal. 
RUSSON, Judge (dissenting): 
I dissent. In my opinion, the Utah District Court did 
have jurisdiction in this matter and, further, had a right to 
exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody 
9. The dissent correctly points out that had the "stay-at-home 
parent, of his or her own volition, moved from Montana, Utah 
would then be able to exercise its jurisdiction." However, it 
does not follow that "had the stay-at-home parent, of his or her 
own volition, never asserted his or her custody rights in 
Montana, Utah would also be able to exercise its jurisdiction." 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)1 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention 
Act (PKPA). 
The majority opinion fails to adhere to the plain and 
unambiguous language of the UCCJA and the PKPA, as well as to 
their spirit and purpose, in its erroneous determination that the 
Utah District Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the 
matter that was before it.2 
I. BACKGROUND 
Prior to the UCCJA, there was constant conflict between 
custody orders of states having concurrent jurisdiction. This 
usually occurred when one parent moved from the state which 
granted the divorce to a different state, and then filed an 
action in the second state for custody of the minor children. 
Where the children were present with that parent, either by 
visitation or by having been taken there, that state naturally 
had jurisdiction to deal with their custody. If the decree 
entered was contrary to the decree of the original forum state, 
then the parties (and the courts) were faced with the problem of 
conflicting orders. 
II. JURISDICTION UNDER THE UCCJA 
A. Section 3 of the UCCJA3 
To solve this problem, the UCCJA was proposed and has now 
been adopted in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 
It specifically recognizes that two states may have simultaneous 
1. In Utah, the UCCJA is set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-1 
to -26 (1987 and Supp. 1991). At all times relevant to this 
case, the statutory language found in the 1987 version of the 
statute governs. For the sake of consistency and clarity, all 
sections of the UCCJA are cross-referenced to the corresponding 
sections as set forth therein. 
2. In order to properly understand the state and federal 
responses to conflicts between states having concurrent 
jurisdiction, one must be aware that the UCCJA was first proposed 
in August 1968, while Congress did not enact the PKPA until 
December 1980. Accordingly, these two documents will be 
addressed chronologically. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987). 
concurrent jurisdiction, but directs how such jurisdiction shall 
be exercised: 
(1) A court of this state which is 
competent to decide child custody matters has 
jurisdiction to make a child custody 
determination by initial or modification 
decree if the conditions as set forth in any 
of the following paragraphs are met: 
(a) This state (i) is the 
home state of the child at the time 
of commencement of the proceeding, 
or (ii) had been the child's home 
state within six months before 
commencement of the proceeding and 
the child is absent from this state 
because of his removal or retention 
by a person claiming his custody or 
for other reasons, and a parent or 
person acting as parent continues 
to live in this state; 
(b) It is in the best 
interest of the child that a court 
of this state assume jurisdiction 
because (i) the child and his 
parents, or the child and at least 
one contestant, have a significant 
connection with this state, and 
(ii) there is available in this 
state substantial evidence 
concerning the child's present or 
future care, protection, training, 
and personal relationships; 
(c) The child is physically 
present in this state, and (i) the 
child has been abandoned or (ii) it 
is necessary in an emergency to 
protect the child because he has 
been subjected to or threatened 
with mistreatment or abuse or is 
otherwise neglected or dependent; 
or 
(d) (i) It appears that no 
other state would have jurisdiction 
under prerequisites substantially 
in accordance with Paragraphs (a), 
(b), or (c), or another state has 
declined to exercise jurisdiction 
on the ground that this state is 
the more appropriate forum to 
determine the custody of the child, 
and (ii) it is in the best interest 
of the child that this court assume 
jurisdiction-
Utah Code Ann- § 78-45C-3 (1987) (emphasis added). 
"Home state" is defined by the UCCJA to mean: 
the state in which the child immediately 
preceding the time involved lived with his 
parents, a parent, or a person acting as 
parent, for at least six consecutive months, 
and in the case of a child less than six 
months old the state in which the child lived 
from birth with any of the persons mentioned. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-2(5) (1987). 
The operation of section 34 was explained by the drafters 
of the UCCJA, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, as follows: 
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection 
(a)5 establish the two major bases for 
jurisdiction. In the first place, a court in 
the child's home state has jurisdiction, and 
secondly, if there is no home state or the 
child and his family have equal or stronger 
ties with another state, a court in that 
state has jurisdiction. If this alternative 
test produces concurrent jurisdiction in more 
than one state, the mechanisms provided in 
sections 66 and 77 are used to assure that 
only one state makes the custody decision. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987). 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a)(i), (ii) (1987) 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-6 (1987). 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-7 (1987). 
Paragraph (2)8 comes into play either 
when the home state test cannot be met or as 
an alternative to that test. The first 
situation arises, for example, when a family 
has moved frequently and there is no state 
where the child has lived for 6 months prior 
to suit, or if the child has recently been 
removed from his home state and the person 
who was left behind has also moved away. See 
paragraph (1),9 last clause. A typical 
example of alternative jurisdiction is the 
case in which the stay-at-home parent chooses 
to follow the departed spouse to state 2 
(where the child has lived for several months 
with the other parent) and starts proceedings 
there. 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Comment at 20-21 (1968) 
(emphasis added) (hereinafter Comment). 
Thus, the plain language of section 310 and the comments 
thereto provide that State Two has jurisdiction if it meets one 
of the bases established in that section. 
B. Other Sections of the UCCJA 
Moreover, if Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987) is construed 
otherwise, the remaining sections of the UCCJA fail to make sense 
wherein they require that State Two shall stay proceedings if the 
matter is pending in another state, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-6(3) 
(1987); or may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the first 
state is a more appropriate forum, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7 
(1987); or may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the 
petitioner is guilty of improper conduct, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45c-8(l) (1987); and shall not exercise its jurisdiction to 
modify unless the interest of the child necessitates, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45c-8(2) (1987). All of the foregoing are indicia of 
jurisdiction: If a court does not have jurisdiction, it does not 
have the power to stay proceedings, nor the power to decline to 
exercise its jurisdiction, nor the power to proceed with the 
proceedings even if to do so would be in the best interest of the 
children's safety and well being. It would have no choice but to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
8. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a)(ii) (1987). 
9. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a)(i) (1987). 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987). 
However, a court does have these choices because the UCCJA 
specifically confers jurisdiction on the second state where the 
child and a parent have been living for at least six consecutive 
months (home state), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(1) (a) (1987); or 
when it is in the best interest of the child to assume 
jurisdiction because the child and at least one parent have a 
significant connection with the second state and there is 
substantive evidence in that state pertaining to the child's 
care, protection, training and personal relationships, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45c-3(1)(b) (1987); or in the case of an emergency, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(1)(c) (1987); or when no other state 
has jurisdiction or another state has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3(1)(d) (1987). 
C. Utah Cases 
The Utah. Supreme Court's holding in Tu^^le^y^~HeadersonT~628 
E*^^P^3^B^t:iSai5 offers additional inSfgffTTrito the issue of 
^fnc^rent jurisdiction under the UCCJA. In that case, the trial 
court acknowledged that it had jurisdiction, but refused to 
exercise it under the circumstances of that case. Id. at 1276. 
Although Tuttle is a pre-UCCJA case, the court quoted extensively 
from the UCCJA and found that the UCCJA provided persuasive 
authority to support its affirmance of the trial court's holding 
that it had concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 1276-77. 
Also instructive is the Utah Supreme Court's holding in 
copm^m^^^^1^< 714 p-2d 1121 («arri§5>> a
 post-uccjA 
agBm^Wf^* mat" case, an action was filed by the Coppedges in 
Oregon, to make them guardians of their grandson, who was living 
with them in Oregon. In response, a custody action by the 
child's parents was subsequently filed in Utah. The Utah Supreme 
Court ordered the district court "to stay the Utah action to the 
extent that it seeks to determine custody under the Uniform Act" 
and "to communicate with che Oregon Court . . . to determine the 
propriety of further proceedings in Oregon." Id. at 1122. The 
district court was further instructed that "[i]n the event that 
the Oregon court stays its proceedings after such communication, 
then the Utah court may proceed to adjudicate the custody 
matter." Id. If Utah did not have jurisdiction, then the 
district court could not have been ordered to stay its 
proceedings nor to proceed after communicating with Oregon. On 
the other hand, if Oregon did not have jurisdiction, then the 
Utah Supreme Court would have simply concluded such and ordered 
the district court to proceed. The only conclusion that can be 
drawn from this case is the existence of concurrent jurisdiction. 
See also State in rnterest of W.D. v. Drake. 770 P.2d 1011, 1013 
(Utah App. 1989) (under the facts of that case, Utah and 
California had concurrent jurisdiction); Rawlinas v. Weiner, 752 
P.2d 1327, 1331 (Utah App.) (Bench, J., concurring) (under the 
facts of that case, Utah had primary jurisdiction and Washington 
had secondary jurisdiction), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1988) . 
III. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION 
Once the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA have been 
met, our inquiry then turns to the exercise of that jurisdiction* 
Just because a state has jurisdiction does not mean that it can 
exercise it as to custody. State Two "shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction under this act if at the time of filing the petition 
a proceeding concerning custody of the child was pending in a 
court of another state exercising jurisdiction . . . ." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45c-6(l) (1987). In such case, State Two "shall 
stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in which the 
other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be 
litigated in the more appropriate forum . . . ." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45c-6(3) (1987). Secondly, a court may decline to exercise 
its jurisdiction if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7(l) (1987). Thirdly, where State Two 
has jurisdiction, it generally cannot modify the custody decree 
of State One unless it appears to the court of State Two that 
State One "does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional 
requirements substantially in accordance with [the UCCJA] or has 
declined to assume jurisdiction!;.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-
14(1)(a) (1987).11 Thus, even if jurisdiction is established 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-
6, -7, and -14 (1987) govern the exercise of that jurisdiction. 
However, if both parents and the children move from the 
state of the original decree, deference to that state's 
jurisdiction is no longer required. State in Interest of D.S.K., 
792 P.2d 118, 124 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Bodenheimer, 
Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing 
Jurisdiction under the UCCJA. 14 Fam. L.Q. 203, 214-15 (1981)). 
As the drafters7 comment to section 1412 states: 
11. State Two may nonetheless proceed with matters other than 
custody. As stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7(6) (1987), 
"[t]he court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this 
act if a custody determination is incidental to an action for 
divorce on another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over 
the divorce or other proceedings." 
12. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14 (1987). 
Courts which render a custody decree 
normally retain continuing jurisdiction to 
modify the decree under local law. Courts in 
other states have in the past often assumed 
jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state 
decree themselves without regard to the 
preexisting jurisdiction of the other state. 
See People ex rel. Halvev v. Halvev, 330 U.S. 
610, 67 S.Ct. 903 (1947). In order to 
achieve greater stability of custody 
arrangements and avoid forum shopping, 
subsection (a) declares that other states 
will defer to the continuing jurisdiction of 
the court of another state as long as that 
state has jurisdiction under the standards of 
the Act. In other words, all petitions for 
modification are to be addressed to the prior 
state if that state has sufficient contact 
with the case to satisfy section 3.13 The 
fact that the court had previously considered 
the case may be one factor favoring its 
continued jurisdiction. If, however, all the 
persons involved have moved away or the 
contact with the state has otherwise become 
slight, modification jurisdiction would shift 
elsewhere. Compare Ratner, Child Custody in 
a Federal System, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 795, 821-
22 (1964). 
For example, if custody was awarded to 
the father in state 1 where he continued to 
live with the children for two years and 
thereafter his wife kept the children in 
state 2 for 6-1/2 months (3-1/2 months beyond 
her visitation privileges) with or without 
permission of the husband, state 1 has 
preferred jurisdiction to modify the decree 
despite the fact that state 2 has in the 
meantime become the "home state" of the 
child. If, however, the father also moved 
away from state 1, that state loses 
modification jurisdiction interstate, whether 
or not its jurisdiction continues under local 
law. See Clark, Domestic Relations 322-23 
(1968). 
Comment at 32. 
13. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987). 
Additionally, if the stay-at-home parent fails to assert his 
or her custody rights, then State One's jurisdiction ceases: 
[I]f the father in the same case continued to 
live in state 1, but let his wife keep the 
children for several years without asserting 
his custody rights and without visits of 
the children in state 1, modification 
jurisdiction of state 1 would cease. Compare 
Brenale v. Hurst, 408 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1966). 
Id. 
IV. APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR 
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, there is no 
question but that the Utah District Court has jurisdiction under 
the plain language of the UCCJA. Utah is the home state of the 
children because they have lived here with their mother for over 
two years, substantially longer than the six months required by 
the UCCJA. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a) (1987). 
Furthermore, the children and Mrs. Crump have significant 
connection with Utah and substantial evidence exists in Utah 
concerning their training, care, protection and personal 
relationships. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-l(l)(c), -3(b) 
(1987). "Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, 
[appellate courts] will not look beyond to divine legislative 
intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a statute should 
be construed according to its plain language." Allisen v. 
American Legion Post No. 134. 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988) 
(citation omitted). Thus, we should hold that according to the 
plain language of section 78-45c-3, the Utah district court and 
this court have jurisdiction to hear this case. 
Furthermore, although Mr. Crump has continued to live in 
Montana, he came to Utah, docketed the Montana judgment in Utah, 
petitioned the Utah Court to modify the Montana decree, and then 
appealed that judgment to this court. The Utah District Court 
had before it the children and mother who had lived in Utah for 
over two years, and the father who petitioned the Utah court 
seeking to modify the Montana custody decree. Such a scenario 
was the subject of the drafters' comment to section 3,14 wherein 
it stated: "A typical example of alternative jurisdiction is the 
case in which the stay-at-home parent chooses to follow the 
departed spouse to state 2 (where the child has lived for several 
months with the other parent) and starts proceedings there." 
14. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987). 
Comment at 21. That is exactly what we have in this case: Mr. 
Crump (stay-at-home parent) chose to follow Mrs. Crump (departed 
spouse) to Utah (where the children have lived for over two years 
with their mother) and commence proceedings in Utah. This offers 
further support for concluding that the district court had 
jurisdiction to hear this case. 
Having found that the jurisdictional requirements of the 
UCCJA have been met, our inquiry turns to whether or not the Utah 
court could exercise its jurisdiction. As noted above, if Mr. 
Crump had, of his own volition, moved from Montana, Utah would 
then be able to exercise its jurisdiction. Also, if Mr. Crump, 
of his own volition, had never asserted his custody rights in 
Montana, Utah would then be able to exercise its jurisdiction. 
The question which remains for us is whether Utah should be able 
to exercise its jurisdiction when Mr. Crump, of his own volition, 
chooses to follow Mrs. Crump to Utah and bring suit here. 
This very question was answered in wITliaifts^, Williams, 555 
NrE.Zd 142 (Ind. 1990).15 In that case, the father lived in 
Indiana'^yrth one child and the mother lived in Illinois with the 
other child. She filed a petition in Indiana for custody of both 
children. The Indiana court awarded custody of both children to 
the father. The mother appealed, and the Indiana Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that because Illinois 
was the home state of the one child, Indiana lacked jurisdiction 
under the UCCJA to deal with custody. 
The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the court of appeals, 
stating: 
Once a court possesses subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider the general class or 
kind of case, its specific jurisdiction over 
a particular case within the general class is 
subject to waiver. In rState ex rel. Hiaht 
v. Marion Superior Court, 547 N.E.2d 267, 270 
(Ind. 1989)] we observed: 
Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-3(a) 
and (b) empower a trial court to 
hear causes of action for 
dissolution and for child support. 
15. Although Williams concerns an initial custody determination, 
rather than modification of custody, it is nonetheless persuasive 
because the UCCJA establishes the same jurisdictional standards 
for child custody determinations by initial or modification 
decree. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l) (1987). 
Within this grant of subject matter 
jurisdiction is the power to 
determine child support. (Ind. 
Code § 31-1-11.5-12), child custody 
(Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-20), and 
visitation (Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-
24). By filing the dissolution 
action, [the wife] engaged the 
trial court's subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear dissolution 
cases, which includes the authority 
to decide issues of child support 
and visitation. 
Resolution of the subject matter 
jurisdiction issue involves determining 
whether the claim advanced falls within the 
general scope of authority conferred upon the 
court by the constitution or statute. The 
authority to hear child custody cases is not 
directly granted by the UCCJA. Rather, Sec. 
3(a) merely operates to restrict the existing 
power of courts to hear custody cases. Ind. 
Code § 31-1-11.6-3(a) begins: 
A court of this state which is 
competent to decide child custody 
matters has jurisdiction to make 
child custody determination by 
initial remodification decree if: 
[emphasis added] 
The source of this competency to decide child 
custody matters is found in Ind. Code § 31-1-
11.5-2 0 and is an incidental grant of 
specific authority within the general grant 
of subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
actions for dissolution and child support. 
The jurisdictional limitations imposed by the 
UCCJA are not equivalent to declarations of 
subject matter jurisdiction, but rather are 
refinements of the ancillary capacity of a 
trial court to exercise authority over a 
particular case. This exercise of authority 
is waivable. 
90 
Because of the voluntary conduct of 
Bonnie in affirmatively engaging the Indiana 
courts to determine custody, and expressly 
consenting to the trial court's authority to 
determine custody, we find that she has 
waived any question regarding the authority 
of the court to decide the issue of custody 
under the facts of her case and has thus 
waived the trial court's jurisdiction over 
her particular case. 
Id, at 144-45 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Also persuasive is the Indiana Court of Appeals' holding in 
SchnffJ^ er yi;:3X&tomi&e&^^ find. App. 1990) • In 
cilWOMBrtahces similar to those in the case at bar, the court held 
that under the UCCJA, Indiana had jurisdiction to modify a 
Wisconsin custody decree because the stay-at-home parent 
"voluntarily submitted himself to the trial court's 
jurisdiction,11 Id. at 199, thereby raising an inference that the 
parties considered Indiana to be the more appropriate forum. Id. 
In the present case, this court raised sua sponte an 
objection to jurisdiction, and now bases its decision on a lack 
thereof. Instead, we should infer from Mr. Crump's decision to 
come to Utah, docket the Montana judgment here, petition the Utah 
Court to modify the Montana decree, and then appeal that judgment 
to this court, that the parties before us consider Utah the more 
appropriate forum in which to litigate this action. See^ itTso In 
re Manriacre of Slate. 53ff~!r.EU2ti; 894 (1X1. App. 1989) ("Under the 
UCCJA, jurisdiction refers not to the due process limitations of 
potential subject matter or personal jurisdiction, but instead to 
the legislature's discretionary limitation upon the exercise of 
existing jurisdiction. Thus the Act permits some discretion in 
the trial court's determination of its jurisdiction to ensure 
that jurisdiction takes place in the forum where the ties between 
the State and the child and his family are the closest." Id. at 
896 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); In Re~ Marriage of 
Weinstein, 408 tf*E,2d 952 (III* App. 1980) ("[W]here both 
prospective custodians are present in a state and there is an 
opportunity for a full hearing on the custody issue, the 
jurisdictional requirements of the Uniform Act may be satisfied." 
Id. at 956 (citing Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207, 1229 (1969)). 
In our case, the district court was competent to decide 
child custody matters under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp. 
1991) ("The district court has original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution 
and not prohibited by law."); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(1) (1989) 
("Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as provided 
by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as provided by 
this chapter."); and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(5)(d) (1989) ("In 
all actions the court and the judge have jurisdiction over . . . 
the custody and maintenance of minor children[.]"). See also 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5. Moreover, Utah has jurisdiction to 
make child custody determinations under Utah Code Ann. § 78-4 5c-3 
(1987). Since Mr. Crump voluntarily and affirmatively engaged 
the Utah courts to modify the Montana decree, in doing so he 
waived any question regarding authority of the Utah courts to 
decide the issue under the facts of this case and has thus waived 
any objection to the district court's authority to exercise its 
jurisdiction over this particular case. 
Furthermore, the majority opinion misconstrues the plain 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) in reaching its 
erroneous conclusion that the said section strips Utah courts of 
jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) provides: 
If a court of another state has made a 
custody decree, a court of this state shall 
not modify that decree unless (a) it appears 
to the court of this state that the court 
which rendered the decree does not now 
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional 
prerequisites substantially in accordance 
with this act or has declined to assume 
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the 
court of this state has jurisdiction. 
The plain language of this section recognizes that both states 
can have concurrent jurisdiction: Montana has jurisdiction 
because it made the custody decree, and unless Utah also has 
jurisdiction under another section of the act, subsection (b) 
above is meaningless. Thus, it is clear that this section does 
not contain qualifying language that strips Utah courts of 
jurisdiction, but instead addresses the exercise of that 
jurisdiction.16 
Although the majority opinion correctly states that 
acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on the court, such is inapplicable here. The 
parties are not purporting to confer jurisdiction upon the Utah 
16. Additionally, it should be noted that the Utah district 
court did not modify the Montana decree as to custody. While the 
Utah court had jurisdiction to modify the Montana custody decree, 
it chose not to because there had not been a substantial change 
of circumstances. 
courts. As shown above, Utah already had jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987). By coming to Utah, docketing the 
Montana judgment here, petitioning the Utah District Court to 
modify the Montana custody decree, and appealing that judgment to 
this court, Mr. Crump did not purport to waive Montana's 
jurisdiction, but simply waived any objection to Utah's authority 
to exercise its jurisdiction. 
V. JURISDICTION UNDER THE 
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT 
Nor is Utah's jurisdiction prohibited under the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1991). In fact, 
both the plain language of the statute and its spirit and 
purposes support the conclusion that Utah has jurisdiction. 
Subsection (f) of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1991) contains language 
similar to that found in Utah Code Ann. 78-45c-14(l) (1987).17 
Subsection (f) provides: 
A court of a State may modify a 
determination of the custody of the same 
child made by a court of another State, if — 
(1) it has jurisdiction to 
make such a child custody 
determination; and 
(2) the court of the other 
state no longer has jurisdiction, 
or it has declined to exercise such 
jurisdiction to modify such 
determination. 
As is the case with section 78-45c-14, this section does not 
strip Utah courts of jurisdiction, but merely addresses the 
exercise of that jurisdiction. The majority opinion acknowledges 
as much wherein it states that the jurisdictional prerequisites 
17. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) provides: 
If a court of another state has made a 
custody decree, a court of this state shall 
not modify that decree unless (a) it appears 
to the court of this state that the court 
which rendered the decree does not now 
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional 
prerequisites substantially in accordance 
with this act or has declined to assume 
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the 
court of this state has jurisdiction. 
of subsection (1) have been met. Nonetheless, the majority 
opinion then seems to contradict itself by reaching the 
conclusion that despite the fact that subsection (1) has been 
met, the Utah courts do not have jurisdiction. 
Secondly, an examination of the purposes of the act support 
Utah assuming jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case. 
Those purposes include: (1) deterring interstate abductions, 
(2) determination of custody by the state which can best decide 
the case in the interest of the child, (3) facilitating the 
enforcement of custody decrees of sister states, and (4) 
promotion of greater stability of home environment. See 
generally Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-611, § 7, 94 Stat. 3569 (1980). First, the case at bar does 
not concern a parent that has abducted a child and moved 
elsewhere to find a more favorable forum. Instead, we have a 
very different scenario in which the stay-at-home parent has 
affirmatively chosen to follow the departed spouse to the home 
state of the children and bring suit there. Secondly, as 
discussed above, since Mrs. Crump and the children have lived in 
Utah for over two years, Utah is in the best position to decide 
the case in the interest of the children. Thirdly, since the 
Utah District Court did not modify the custody portion of the 
Montana decree, its decision does facilitate enforcement of that 
decree. Lastly, rather than promoting greater stability of home 
environment, the majority opinion instead promotes the excessive 
litigation that the act was created to curb. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I would hold that the trial court had jurisdiction, as 
well as the right to exercise its jurisdiction in this matter. 
Accordingly, I would hold that this court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal, and that the matter should proceed on appeal. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
18. While the result in this case in no way compels either party 
to petition for certiorari in Utah, or modification in Montana, 
resolution of this controversy may require such. This 
possibility is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that 
the children have already appeared twice before judges in two 
states. 
APP. 2. CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah UCCJA, Sections 78-45c-l-3, 7, 
13 and 14 
Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Section 
78-22a-2, 3 
PKPA, 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A, 
including Congressional Findings 
and Declaration of Purposes. 
UTAH UCCJA 
78-45c-l. Purposes - Construction 
(1) The general purposes of this act are to: 
(a) avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict with 
courts of other states in matters of child custody which have 
in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to 
state with harmful effects on their well-being; 
(b) promote cooperation with the courts of other states 
to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that the state 
which can best decide the case in the interest of the child; 
(c) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a 
child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child 
and his family have the closest connection and where 
significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training 
and personal relationships is most readily available, and that 
courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when 
the child and his family have a closer connection with another 
state; 
(d) discourage continuing controversies over child 
custody in the interest of greater stability of home 
environment and of secure family relationships for the child; 
(e) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of 
children undertaken to obtain custody awards; 
(f) avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other 
states in this state insofar as feasible; 
(g) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of 
other states; 
(h) promote and expand the exchange of information and 
other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this 
state and those of other states concerned with the same child; 
and 
(i) to make uniform the law of those states which enact 
it. 
(2) This title shall be construed to promote the general 
purposes stated in this section. 1980 
78-45C-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Contestant" means a person, including a parent, who 
claims a right to custody or visitation rights with respect to a 
child; 
(2) "Custody determination" means a court decision and court 
orders and instructions providing for the custody of a child, 
including visitation rights; it does not include a decision 
relating to child support or any other monetary obligation of any 
person; 
(3) "Custody proceeding" includes proceedings in which a 
custody determination is one of several issues, such as an action 
for dissolution of marriage, or legal separation, and includes 
child neglect and dependency proceedings; 
(4) "Decree" or "custody decree" means a custody 
determination contained in a judicial decree or order made in a 
custody proceeding, and includes an initial decree and a 
modification decree; 
(5) "Home state" means the state in which the child 
immediately preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a 
parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive 
months, and in the case of a child less than six months old the 
state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons 
mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of any of the named 
persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period; 
(6) "Initial decree" means the first custody decree 
concerning a particular child; 
(7) "Modification decree" means a custody decree which 
modifies or replaces a prior decree whether made by the court which 
rendered the prior decree or by another court; 
(8) "Physical custody" means actual possession and control of 
a child; 
(9) "Person acting as parent" means a person, other than a 
parent, who has physical custody of a child and who has either been 
awarded custody by the court or claims a right to custody; and 
(10) "State" means any state, territory or possession of the 
United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of 
Columbia. 
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78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state. 
(1) A court of this state which is competent to decide child 
custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody 
determination by initial or modification decree if the conditions 
as set forth in any of the following paragraphs are met: 
(a) this state: 
(i) is the home state of the child at the time of 
commencement of the proceeding; or 
(ii) had been the child's home state within six 
months before commencement of the proceeding and 
the child is absent from this state because of his 
removal or retention by a person claiming his 
custody or for other reasons, and a parent or 
person acting as parent continues to live in this 
state; 
(b) it is in the best interest of the child that a court 
of this state assume jurisdiction because: 
(i) the child and his parents, or the child and at 
least one contestant, have a significant connection 
with this state; and 
(ii) there is available in this state substantial 
evidence concerning the child's present or future 
care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships; 
(c) the child is physically present in this state or 
this state is the most recent domicile of the mother prior to 
the birth of the child, and: 
(i) the child has been abandoned; or 
(ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the 
child because he has been subjected to or 
threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is 
otherwise neglected or dependent; or 
(d) (i) It appears that no other state would have 
jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance 
with Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c), or another state has 
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this 
state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody 
of the child, and 
(ii) it is in the best interest of the child that 
this court assume jurisdiction. 
(2) Except under Subsections (l)(c) and (d), physical 
presence in this state of the child, or of the child and one of the 
contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a 
court of this state to make a child custody determination. 
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a 
prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody. 
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78-45C-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient 
forum - Factors in determination - Communication 
with other court - Awarding costs. 
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make an 
initial or modification decree may decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it finds that it is 
an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under the 
circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is a 
more appropriate forum. 
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the 
court's own motion or upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem 
or other representative of the child. 
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court 
shall consider if it is in the interest of the child that another 
state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take into 
account the following factors, among others: 
(a) if another state is or recently was the child's home 
state; 
(b) if another state has a closer connection with the 
child and his family or with the child and one or more of the 
contestants; 
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the child's 
present or future care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships is more readily available in another state; 
(d) if the parties have agreed on another forum which is 
no less appropriate; and 
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this 
state would contravene any of the purposes stated in Section 
78-45C-1. 
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain 
jurisdiction the court may communicate with a court of another 
state and exchange information pertinent to the assumption of 
jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring that 
jurisdiction will be exercised by the more appropriate court and 
that a forum will be available to the parties. 
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and 
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it may 
dismiss the proceedings, or it may stay the proceedings upon 
condition that a custody proceeding be promptly commenced in 
another named state or upon any other conditions which may be just 
and proper, including the condition that a moving party stipulate 
his consent and submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum* 
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under 
this act if a custody determination is incidental to an action for 
divorce or another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over the 
divorce or other proceeding* 
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an 
inappropriate forum it may require the party who commenced the 
proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs of the proceedings in 
this state, necessary travel and other expenses, including 
attorney's fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses. 
Payment is to be made to the clerk of the court for remittance to 
the proper party. 
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section 
the court shall inform the court found to be the more appropriate 
forum of this fact, or if the court which would have jurisdiction 
in the other state is not certainly known, shall transmit the 
information to the court administrator or other appropriate 
official for forwarding to the appropriate court. 
(9) Any communication received from another state informing 
this state of a finding of inconvenient forum because a court of 
this state is the more appropriate forum shall be filed in the 
custody registry of the appropriate court. Upon assuming 
jurisdiction the court of this state shall inform the original 
court of this fact. 
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78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees. 
The courts of this state shall recognize and enforce an 
initial or modification decree of a court of another state which 
had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially 
in accordance with this act or which was made under factual 
circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act, so 
long as this decree has not been modified in accordance with 
jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this 
act. 
1980. 
78-45c-14. Modification of foreign decree - Prerequisites -
Factors considered. 
(1) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a 
court of this state shall not modify that decree unless (a) it 
appears to the court of this state that the court which rendered 
the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional 
prerequisites substantially in accordance with this act or has 
declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the 
court of this state has jurisdiction. 
(2) If a court of this state is authorized under Subsection 
(1) and Section 78-45c-8 to modify a custody decree of another 
state it shall give due consideration to the transcript of the 
record and other documents of all previous proceedings submitted to 
it in accordance with Section 78-45c-22. 
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UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT 
78-22a-2. Definition - Filing and status of foreign judgments. 
(1) As used in this chapter, "foreign judgment" means any 
judgment, decreef or order of a court of the United States or of 
any other court whose acts are entitled to full faith and credit in 
this state. 
(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance 
with an appropriate act of Congress or an appropriate act of Utah 
may be filed with the clerk of any district court in Utah. The 
clerk of the district court shall treat the foreign judgment in all 
respects as a judgment of a district court of Utah. 
(3) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter has the same 
effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, 
enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, 
setting aside, or staying as a judgment of a district court of this 
state. 
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78-22a-3. Notice of filing. 
(1) The judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor, at 
the time of filing a foreign judgment, shall file an affidavit with 
the clerk of the district court stating the last known post-office 
address of the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor. 
(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and affidavit, the 
clerk of the district court shall notify the judgment debtor that 
the judgment has been filed. Notice shall be sent to the address 
stated in the affidavit. The clerk shall record the date the 
notice is mailed in the register of actions. The notice shall 
include the name and post-office address of the judgment creditor 
and the name and address of the judgment creditor's attorney, if 
any. 
(3) No execution or other process for the enforcement of a 
foreign judgment filed under this chapter may issue until 30 days 
after the judgment is filed. 
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PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT 
S1738A. Full faith and credit given to child custody 
determinations. 
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce 
according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in 
subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination 
made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of 
another State• 
(b) As used in this section, the term -
(1) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen; 
(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent, who 
claims a right to custody or visitation of a child; 
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or 
other order of a court providing for the custody or 
visitation of a child, and includes permanent and 
temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications; 
(4) "home State" means the State in which, immediately 
preceding the time involved, the child lived with his 
parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at 
least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child 
less than six months old, the State in which the child 
lived from birth with any of such persons. Periods of 
temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as 
part of the six-month or other period; 
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody 
determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or 
otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody 
determination concerning the same child, whether made by 
the same court or not; 
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, or other 
than a parent, who has physical custody of a child and 
who has either been awarded custody by a court or claims 
a right to custody; 
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and 
control of a child; and 
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or 
a territory or possession of the United States. 
(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a State 
is consistent with the provisions of this section only if -
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such 
State; and 
(2) one of the following conditions is met: 
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child 
on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, 
or (ii) had been the child's home State within six 
months before the date of the commencement of the 
proceeding and the child is absent from such State 
because of his removal or retention by a contestant 
or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to 
live in such State; 
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have 
jurisdiction under subparagraph (A)f and (ii) it is 
in the best interest of the child that a court of 
such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the 
child and his parents, or the child and at least 
one contestant, have a significant connection with 
such State other than mere physical presence in 
such State, and (II) there is available in such 
State substantial evidence concerning the child's 
present or future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships; 
(C) the child is physically present in such State 
and (i) the child has been abandoned, or (ii) it is 
necessary in an emergency to protect the child 
because he has been subjected to or threatened with 
mistreatment or abuse; 
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have 
jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or 
(E), or another State has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose 
jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate 
forum to determine the custody of the child, and 
(ii) it is in the best interest of the child that 
such court assume jurisdiction; or 
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant 
to subsection (d) of this section. 
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a 
child custody determination consistently with the provisions of 
this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection 
(c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains 
the residence of the child or of any contestant. 
(e) Before a child custody determination is made, reasonable 
notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the 
contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been 
previously terminated and any person who has physical custody of a 
child. 
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the 
custody of the same child made by a court of another State, if-
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody 
determination; and 
(2) the court of the other State no longer has 
jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such 
jurisdiction to modify such determination. 
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any 
proceeding for a custody determination commenced during the 
pendency of a proceeding in a court of another State where such 
court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently 
with the provisions of this section to make a custody 
determination. 
(Added Dec. 28, 1980, P.L. 96-611, §8(a), 94 Stat. 3569*} 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
effective date of Section: 
Act Dec. 28, 1980, P.L. 96-611, § 2,94 Stat. 3567, which appears as 42 
USCS § 13951 note, provides that this section shall take effect on, and 
apply to services furnished on or after July 1, 1981. 
Other provisions: 
Congressional findings and declaration of purposes. Act Dec. 28. 1980, 
P.L. 96-611, § 7,94 Stat. 3568, effective on and applicable to services 
furnished on or after July 1, 1981, as provided by § 2 of such Act, which 
appears as 42 USCS § 13951 note, provides: 
"(a) The Congress finds that -
"(1) there is a large and growing number of cases annually involving 
disputes between persons claiming rights of custody and visitation 
of children under the laws, and in the courts, of different States, 
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the 
territories and possessions of the United States; 
° (2) the laws and practices by which the courts of those 
jurisdictions determine their jurisdiction to decide such disputes, 
and the effect to be given the decisions of such disputes by the 
courts of other jurisdictions, are often inconsistent and 
conflicting; 
"(3) those characteristics of the law and practice in such cases, 
along with the limits imposed by a Federal system on the authority 
of each such jurisdiction to conduct investigations and take other 
actions outside its own boundaries, contribute to a tendency of 
parties involved in such disputes to frequently resort to the 
seizure, restraint, concealment, and interstate transportation of 
children, the disregard of court orders, excessive relitigation of 
cases, obtaining of conflicting orders by the courts of various 
jurisdictions, and interstate travel and communication that is so 
expensive and time consuming as to disrupt their occupations and 
commercial activities; and 
"(4) among the results of those conditions and activities are the 
failure of the courts of such jurisdictions to give full faith and 
credit to the judicial proceedings of the other jurisdictions, the 
deprivation of rights of liberty and property without due process of 
law, burdens on commerce among such jurisdictions and with foreign 
nations, and harm to the welfare of children and their parents and 
other custodians. 
" (b) For those reasons it is necessary to establish a national system for 
locating parents and children who travel from one such jurisdiction to another 
and are concealed in connection with such disputes, and to establish national 
standards under which the courts of such jurisdictions will determine their 
jurisdiction to decide such disputes and the effect to be given by each such 
jurisdiction to such decisions by the courts of other such jurisdictions. 
M(c) The general purposes of sections 6 to 10 of this Act [which, among 
other things, enacted this note; for full classification, consult USCS Tables 
volumes] are to -
" (1) promote cooperation between State courts to the end that a 
determination of custody and visitation is rendered in the State 
which can best decide the case in the interest of the child; 
"(2) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms 
of mutual assistance between States which are concerned with the 
same child; 
"(3) facilitate the enforcement of custody and visitation decrees of 
sister States; 
"(4) discourage continuing interstate controversies over child 
custody in the interest of greater stability of home environment and 
of secure family relationships for the child; 
"(5) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State 
courts in the matters of child custody and visitation which have in 
the past resulted in the shifting of children from State to state 
with harmful effects on their well-being; and 
"(6) deter interstate abductions and other unilateral removals of 
children undertaken to obtain custody and visitation awards.". 
States encouraged to give priority to custody proceedings; award of expenses, 
fees and costs. Act Dec. 28, 1980, P.L. 96-611, §8(c), 94 Stat. 3571, effective 
on and applicable to services furnished on or after July 1, 1981, provides: 
"In furtherance of the purposes of Section 1738A of title 28, United States 
Code, as added by subsection (a) of this section [this section], State courts are 
encouraged to -
"(1) afford priority to proceedings for custody determinations; and 
" (2) award to the person entitled to custody or visitation pursuant 
to a custody determination which is consistent with the provisions 
of such section 1738A [this section], necessary travel expenses, 
attorneys' fees, costs of private investigations, witness fees or 
expenses, and other expenses incurred in connection with such 
custody determination in any case in which -
"(A) a contestant has, without the consent of the person 
entitled to custody or visitation pursuant to a custody 
determination which is consistent with the provisions of such 
section 1738A [this section], (i) wrongfully removed the child 
from the physical custody of such person, or (ii) wrongfully 
retained the child after a visit or other temporary 
relinquishment of physical custody; or 
M(B) the court determines it is appropriate.". 
APP. 3. Letter from Mary Noonan, Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals, 
nua v o iyy| 
Russell W Bench 
PreMding judge 
Judith M Billings 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Regnal W Garff 
Judge 
Pamela T Green wood 
Judge 
Norman H Jackson 
ludge 
Gregory K Orme 
udge 
e^onard H Russon 
udge 
Utafj Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
2 30 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
801 533-6800 
A u g u s t 6 , 1991 
Robert Hunt, Esq. 
Gridley, Echard & Ward 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Stephen W. Jewell, Esq. 
Jenkins and Burbank 
bl East 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Re: Crump v. Crump, 900362-CA 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Dear Counsel, 
I am writing to confirm my telephone conversations with each of 
you individually with respect to the above referenced matter. 
As you know, oral argument herein is scheduled in the Utah Court 
of Appeals on 27 August 1991. Prior to argument, the Court requests 
a written response to its concerns about a potential jurisdictional 
infirmity in the case. Specifically, the Court is concerned that it 
may not have subject matter jurisdiction for reason of the 
continuing jurisdiction of another state (Montana). 
Enclosed for your reference is a copy of this Court's 1990 
decision, In Re D.S.K. and C.R.K., which may be helpful as you 
prepare your response. The Court requests that the responses be 
filed on or before Tuesday, 20 August 1991. 
As we discussed, the Court will not strike the matter from the 
oral argument calendar. However, depending in part upon the written 
responses, the Couit may treat argument as an order to show cause 
hearing, requesting appellant to show cause why the appeal should 
not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
Sincerely, 
Mary X1/ Noonan 
CienK of the Court 
MTN:kv 
Enc. 
